Published opinion, 30 June 2025 · source · PDF · 16 pages
After the trial court entered a final judgment and decree of divorce, Nimat Shahid (“ Wife” ) filed a petition to reopen the case and set aside the final judgment, arguing that service by publication was improper. The trial court denied the motion, using an order that relied upon non-existent case law. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the order and remand for the trial court to hold a new hearing on Wife’s petition.
Reynolds,1 Wife argues that the superior court erred when it denied her petition to reopen the case and set aside the divorce decree because Husband did not make a sufficient showing of due diligence to allow service by publication under OCGA § 9-11-4 (f). Wife points out in her brief that the trial court relied on two fictitious cases in its order denying her petition, and she argues that the order is therefore, “ void on its face.” In his Appellee’s Brief, Husband does not respond to Wife’s assertion that the trial court’s order relied on bogus case law. Husband’s attorney, Diana Lynch, relies on four cases in this division, two of which appear to be fictitious, possibly 1 296 Ga.
461 (769 SE2d 511) (2015). 2 “ hallucinations” made up by generative-artificial intelligence (“ AI” ),2 and the other two have nothing to do with the proposition stated in the Brief.3 Undeterred by Wife’s argument that the order (which appears to have been prepared by Husband’s attorney, Diana Lynch) is “ void on its face” because it relies on two non-existent cases, Husband cites to 11 additional cites in response that are either hallucinated or have nothing to do with the propositions for which they are cited. Appellee’s Brief further adds insult to injury by requesting “A ttorney’s Fees on Appeal” and supports this “ request” 4 with one of the new hallucinated cases.
Mass. 2024) (citing What Are AI Hallucinations?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/ai-hallucinations (last visited June 25, 2025)). 3 See Appendix, infra, listing the 11 (out of 15) case citations contained in Appellee’s Brief that fall into one of these two categories.
3 observing only that the order purports to have been prepared by Husband’s attorney, Diana Lynch. We further note that Lynch had cited the two fictitious cases that made it into the trial court’s order in Husband’s response to the petition to reopen, and she cited additional fake cases both in that Response and in the Appellee’s Brief filed in this Court. As noted above, the irregularities in these filings suggest that they were drafted using generative AI.
In his 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts warned that “ any use of AI requires caution and humility.” 5 Roberts specifically noted that commonly used AI applications can be prone to “ hallucinations,” which caused lawyers using those programs to submit briefs with cites to non-existent cases.6 Although the present case may be the first occasion for a Georgia appellate court to confront the problems that can flow from a lawyer’s apparent adoption of generative-AI, other courts have commented on the issue.
Avianca, Inc., that “ there is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance. But existing rules impose a gatekeeping role on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings.” 7 In that case, the attorneys had abandoned their responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations created by the AI tool ChatGPT, then continued to stand by the fake opinions after judicial orders called their existence into question.8 Indeed, [m]any harms flow from the submission of fake opinions. The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception.
8 Id. 5 may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.9 Here, as in Mata, Lynch’s use of fictitious cases and citations has deprived the opposing party of the opportunity to appropriately respond to her arguments. As to Lynch’s request for attorney fees “ for the costs incurred in responding to this appeal[,]” that section of Appellee’s Brief provides: 1.