Docket entry 67, 11 September 2025 · source · PDF · 8 pages
Docket text. RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE re: 62 Order to Show Cause,,. Document filed by Dove Cay, LLC. (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Patrick F. Lennon, # 2 Affidavit Declaration of Kevin J. Lennon, # 3 Affidavit Declaration of Steven R. Winters, # 4 Affidavit Declaration of Elliott T. Williams).(Lennon, Patrick) (Entered: 09/11/2025)
47), that supported the proposition at issue. The inclusion of the fictitious quotations was inadvertent and occurred without any purpose or intent to mislead the Court or opposing counsel. Undersigned counsel emphasize that there was never any intent to mislead the Court or opposing counsel.
I V. Argument Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed While undersigned counsel deeply regret the failure to verify the fictitious quotations generated by the artificial intelligence program used in the initial drafting of the Memorandum, it is respectfully submitted that this lapse does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct, and is readily distinguishable from the conduct of the attorneys in the cases cited in the Court’s Memorandum Order (ECF No. 62), namely Park v.
In Park, the sanctionable conduct arose from two independent sources of misconduct: (1) the plaintiff’s sustained and willful refusal to comply with discovery orders, which led to dismissal under Rules 37 and 41(b), and (2) counsel’s citation to a wholly non- existent case generated by artificial intelligence, without ever reading or verifying the decision. The Second Circuit stressed that such reliance on fabricated authority constitutes a false statement of law and falls below the basic obligations of counsel. As a sanction, counsel was referred to the court’s grievance panel.
As a sanction, counsel was referred to the court’s grievance panel. By contrast, undersigned counsel in this case did not cite any non-existent case or authority. The cases cited—Crescent Towing and General Electric Credit Corp.—are real Fifth Circuit precedents, long recognized in maritime lien jurisprudence.
The cases cited—Crescent Towing and General Electric Credit Corp.—are real Fifth Circuit precedents, long recognized in maritime lien jurisprudence. The issue here is not the existence of fictitious authorities, but rather the inadvertent and unintentional inclusion of two non -existent quotations generated by an artificial intelligence drafting tool in an early draft, which were not cross-checked against the official opinions during a compressed briefing schedule. The circumstances in Mata are likewise far more serious.
The circumstances in Mata are likewise far more serious. There, counsel relied exclusively on the ChatGPT artificial intelligence to generate not only quotations, but also entire case citations to opinions that did not exist in any reporter or database. Even after opposing counsel specifically advised the court that the cases could not be located, counsel did not withdraw the offending submission.
The court found subjective bad faith based on conscious avoidance, repeated misrepresentations, and the failure to correct known falsehoods, and sanctioned both counsel and their firm . Here, by contrast, no counterfeit opinions were submitted, no effort was made to present fictitious case law as binding precedent, and no false representations were made to the Court. The authorities cited were authentic, and the substantive legal propos ition—that interest may be recovered under a maritime lien—was correct, as confirmed by other authorities relied upon both by the Court and by undersigned counsel.
Hall presents yet another distinct scenario. Counsel in that case filed a brief citing three non-existent cases generated by AI, without confirming their existence in any database. While the court ultimately found negligence rather than bad faith, the submissi on nevertheless rested on fabricated authority.